The Federal Government and Tripartism by Adams, Roy  J.
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"The Federal Government and Tripartism"
 
Roy J. Adams
Relations industrielles / Industrial Relations, vol. 37, n° 3, 1982, p. 606-617.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/029281ar
DOI: 10.7202/029281ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 11 février 2017 04:21
The Fédéral Government 
and Tripartism 
Roy J. Adams 
Some of the most highly developed tripartite Systems hâve 
been established in the Scandinavian countries, in Holland and in 
Belgium. The difficulties in implementing such a System in 
Canada are examined. 
Like other industrialized, démocratie countries Canada is in the midst 
of difficult times. The challenge is how to effectively address the problems 
of high inflation, energy shortfalls, unemployment, and low productivity 
growth, in a milieu of rising aspiration for security and participation1. Eco-
nomists, the main source historically for économie guidance on such prob-
lems as unemployment, productivity and inflation hâve split into three more 
or less hostile camps: The Neo-Keynesians, the Monetarists and the Supply-
siders. Each camp has a fairly rigid formula for économie policy but none 
of the formulas seem to be working with great success. The economists, 
moreover, hâve no guidance to offer on the social side of the équation. 
They remain bound by their atomistic imagery which they continue to apply 
to societies which hâve become characterized by strong interest groups 
rather than by independent économie maximizers. 
A realization is beginning to take hold that future socioeconomic suc-
cess is more likely to dépend upon the structure and process of decision-
making than on adhérence to preconceived formulas. Since World War II 
most of the countries of the industrialized world hâve moved towards a Sys-
tem of decision-making which includes labour, management and the state in 
a search for consensus regarding major socioeconomic issues. This develop-
ment was predicated on the belief that "the traditional constitutional 
framework of political decision-making no longer appeared capable, by 
* ADAMS, Roy J., Professor, Personnel and Industrial Relations Area, McMaster 
University. 
** This paper has benefited from comments by Joe Rose on an earlier draft. 
1 See Harold L. WILENSKY, "Leftism, Catholicism and Démocratie Corporatism: 
The Rôle of Political Parties in Welfare State Development", in Flora, Peter and A.J. 
Heidenheimer, eds., The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America, New 
Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books, 1981. 
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itself, of dealing with the complexities of post-war industrialized societies, 
but needed the co-operation and involvement of the main économie interest 
groups in the decision-making process." 2 
Some of the most highly developed tripartite Systems hâve been estab-
lished in the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway and Sweden and 
the low countries of Holland and Belgium. While ail of thèse countries hâve 
had many problems during the past décade their collective socioeconomic 
performance compared to Canada and the U.S. has been noteworthy. They 
hâve had a lower level and incidence of industrial conflict which is very im-
pressive considering that their labour forces are much more highly union-
ized and thus there is apparently more opportunity for conflict3. They hâve 
experienced a lower level of unemployment and hâve strong job security 
laws4. Essentially the entire work force is covered by collective agreements 
and workers hâve been granted the right to participate in management 
through some combination of works councils, local shop floor unions and 
participation on boards of directors5. Welfare state économie security 
schemes are well developed6. 
Thèse countries hâve also outperformed Canada and the U.S. on such 
key économie indicators as GNP and productivity growth. Between 
1969-1979 GNP per capita increased by approximately $9,000 U.S. in thèse 
countries compared to $6,000 U.S. in Canada and the United States7. Man-
ufacturing productivity advanced on average by about 5°7o per year com-
pared to 2% in North America between 1973-19808. 
2 Paul MALLES, "The Road to Consensus Policies: Challenges and Realities", Con-
férence Board in Canada Occasional Paper No. 4, Ottawa, Conférence Board in Canada, 
1976. 
3 See Roy J. ADAMS, "Industrial Relations Systems in Europe and North America", 
in Anderson, John and Morley Gunderson, eds., Union-Management Relations in Canada, 
Don Mills, Ontario, Addison-Wesley, 1982 and Everett M. KASSALOW, "Industrial Conflict 
and Consensus in the U.S. and Western Europe", in Martin, Benjamin and Everett M. 
Kassalow, eds., Labor Relations in Advanced Industrial Societies, New York, Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace, 1980. 
4 See ADAMS, op. cit. and Michael RUBENSTEIN, "Dismissals and the Law: Britain 
and Europe", in Derek Torrington, éd., Comparative Industrial Relations in Europe, 
Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1978. 
5 ADAMS, op. cit. and Klaus VON BEYME, Challenge to Power, London, Sage, 1980. 
6 FLORA and HEIDENHEIMER, op. cit. 
i OECD statistics. In terms of overall standard of living as measured by the purchasing 
power of wages and salaries Canada and the U.S. still lead the world but the North American 
advantage has been substantially decreased during the past décade. See ADAMS, op. cit. 
8 Patricia CAPDEVIELLE and Donato ALVAREZ, "International Comparisons of 
Trends in Productivity and Labor Costs", Monthly Labor Review, vol. 104, no. 12, 1981, pp. 
14-20. 
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One should not infer from thèse figures that tripartism is a panacea. It 
is not easy to reach consensus and indeed in some years in thèse countries it 
has been impossible. Nor does tripartism ensure that the best décisions will 
be reached. For example, Sweden and Holland overextended their social 
welfare Systems and were caught in a difficult bind when the large energy in-
creases took effect in the 1970's. Both countries are now going through dif-
ficult times trying to adjust. 
Obviously, one cannot draw firm conclusions from the expérience of a 
small group of countries. It is quite clear, however, that tripartism has de-
finite advantages over the System for socioeconomic decision-making that 
we now hâve in place in Canada. The career of the récent fédéral budget is a 
good example of the deficiencies of our system. Developed behind closed 
doors by bureaucrats, it was announced in November, 1981. Immediately it 
was met with a storm of criticism by ail concerned groups. Since then the 
government has had to expend considérable energy revising the package so 
that it might move into the range of the politically acceptable. Had a system 
of tripartite consensus been in effect it is very unlikely that so much valua-
ble effort would hâve been wasted on such a politically unacceptable 
scheme. As Malles as noted "it is perfectly clear — without searching for 
Utopian solutions — that Canada's économie poblems would be greatly 
diminished, and économie and social tensions eased, if somehow Canadians 
could learn to work together in unison, toward commonly agreed-upon 
goals, harnessing the énergies of ail three of the social partners in a co-
opérative effort towards mutually advantageous objectives."9 
Numerous statements made by spokesmen for the fédéral government 
of the past décade suggest that there is an awareness of the problem and a 
désire to move towards consensus. In his speech to the founding convention 
of the new Canadian Fédération of Labour Prime Minister Trudeau stated 
that "we live in such a complex society that it's impossible to make it work 
without co-operation among the main économie décision makers."10 In-
stead Trudeau expressed a préférence for a system where labour, business 
and government would "share the responsibility for governing"11. 
Both business and labour hâve strong views about how the economy 
should be managed. For example, the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) 
has recently corne out with a plan for économie recovery which calls for in-
terest rates pegged at no more than 2% above the inflation rate, a morato-
9 MALLES, op. cit. 
10 Transcript of the Prime Minister's Remarks at the Founding Convention of the Cana-
dian Fédération of Labour, Skyline Hôtel, Ottawa, March 31, 1982, p. 4. 
n Ibid., p. 6. During the past décade similar comments hâve been made periodically by 
fédéral ministers of Finance, Labour and Employment and Immigration. 
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rium on mortgage foreclosures, no immédiate change regarding taxation of 
employée benefits and transfer payments to the provinces, large increases in 
expenditures on job création, tax réductions for low income earners, sub-
sidies for wheat and milk, and better pensions for senior citizens12. 
The Business Council on National Issues (BCNI) also believes that it 
knows what should be done. The Council thinks that annual wage increases 
should be held below 7%. Although it doesn't want across-the-board man-
datory controls it does want to control public sector wages and salaries to 
set an example for private industry. It also wants the government to "reaf-
firm with new policy initiatives its claimed support of the private sector as 
the principal engine of économie growth" and to dispel the notion that 
"government is philosophically committed to intervention"13. The BCNI 
also wants to see a revision of the National Energy Program. Canadianiza-
tion rules should be relaxed and better incentives for ail energy companies 
(national and international) should be provided. 
Although both labour and business believe they know what should be 
done neither business nor labour is unequivically willing to take up 
Trudeau's offer to "share the responsibility for governing". CLC président 
Dennis McDermott, for example, recently said that labour was unwilling to 
get involved in a "social contract" because within such schemes labour al-
ways had to moderate wage demands and doing so implied that labour was 
responsible for inflation, a proposition the CLC dénies14. It's hard to find a 
single authoritative spokesman for the wide business community but a ré-
cent editorial in the Financial Times probably summarizes the prédominant 
business view as well as anything. According to the Times business should 
not "share the responsibility" because doing so would confuse the elector-
ate who at élection time must make up its mind "whether the government 
deserves to be thrown out or given another chance"15. 
If one were to rely only on public statements then one would hâve to 
conclude that we do not hâve tripartism in Canada because, even though the 
fédéral government is willing to share power and responsibility, business 
and labour are both unwilling to accept the challenge and opportunity. Such 
a conclusion would be prématuré. The expérience of the past décade sug-
gests that business and labour are more willing to negotiate over issues of 
concern than their public statements would indicate. It also suggests that the 
12 See Charles BAUER, "Canada — Let's Make it Work", Canadian Labour, March, 
1982. 
13 Reported in Ron ANDERSON, "Meach Lake Thinkers Skirt Economie Issues", 
Globe and Mail, April 27, 1982. 
14 Reported in Hamilton Spectator, April 20, 1982. 
15 Financial Times, April 5, 1982. 
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fédéral government is not willing to take the steps necessary for tripartism 
to hâve a sporting chance of success. 
There can be no tripartism unless the government is willing to negotiate 
with business and labour and follow through on consensus décisions. Ail 
tripartite Systems hâve some mechanism for meeting this condition. In the 
Netherlands, for example, représentatives of labour, management and the 
state sit on a National Social and Economie Council which by law must be 
accorded the opportunity to consider ail major socioeconomic issues. Con-
sensus décisions reached by the council are, almost without exception, 
quickly implemented via législation or government decree16. In Sweden tri-
partite commissions are established to investigage major issues. Again, con-
sensus décisions are almost always followed up with enabling government 
action17. 
Canada has no such process. We do make use of tripartite commissions 
but consensus recommendations from such agencies are often ignored or set 
aside. For example, ail of the recommendations of the Commission on Edu-
cational Leave and Productivity, established by Labour Canada in 1978, 
were consensus décisions. None of the recommendations hâve yet been put 
into effect. Indeed, one of its major recommendations — the establishment 
of a levy-credit training scheme — seems not to hâve been given serious con-
sidération despite considérable concern over a training problem of crisis 
dimensions18. 
The Educational Leave Commission was a small opération and its con-
clusions might not hâve been reflective of a true national tripartite consen-
sus, but other developments cannot be dismissed as easily. The behavior of 
the fédéral government during the controls era of the mid-70's is especially 
indicative of its unwillingness to negotiate seriously. In 1974 when percent-
age wage increases began to run ahead of price increases the fédéral govern-
ment took under considération the possibility of wage and price controls. 
Realizing that controls would, in effect, neutralize the decentralized collec-
tive bargaining System formally supported by public policy the government 
16 See John WINDMULLER, Labor Relations in the Netherlands, Ithaca, Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1969. 
17 See Christopher WHEELER, White-Collar Power, Urbana, University of Illinois 
Press, 1975. Tripartite commissions are only one élément of the System in Sweden. Other im-
portant facets of the System include national negotiations regarding wage adjustments, tripar-
tite administration of employment policy, and legally mandated worker participation in enter-
prise décisions. 
18 R.J. ADAMS, P.M. DRAPER and Claude DUCHARME, Education and Working 
Canadians, Ottawa, Labour Canada, 1979. The Dodge Report {Labour Market Development 
in the 1980s, Ottawa, Employment and Immigration Canada, July, 1981) made no mention of 
the levy-credit scheme developed by the Commission on Educational Leave and Productivity. 
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decided to consult with business and labour in pursuit of a national consen-
sus. In tripartite Systems the positions of ail three parties often are made 
known so that they may be assessed and judged by the gênerai public. Such 
a process constrains the parties to demonstrate how their proposais would 
serve the overall public interest. 
Instead of open negotiations on alternative policy options, the Cana-
dian discussions of 1974/75 were held primarily behind closed doors. Both 
business and labour expressed disagreement with various aspects of the ten-
tative program put forth by government and no concensus was reached19. 
Nevertheless, the fédéral government, in 1975, put into effect a controls 
program essentially identical to the one rejected by business and labour20. 
By doing so it created the impression that the consultation process had been 
designed only to win support for a preordained policy décision rather than 
to achieve a mutually acceptable consensus. 
Although incensed at this turn of events the CLC did not engage in a 
policy of pure protest. Instead it developed a set of positive proposais and 
expressed a willingness to negotiate a total socioeconomic package with the 
government21. One of its proposais was the establishment of a tripartite 
Council for Social and Economie Planning very similar to the one in 
Holland. Congress wanted assurances that consensus décisions reached in 
the council would be followed up with effective government action. In 
short, the CLC indicated a willingness to "share the responsibility", but the 
government, when directly confronted with the reality of sharing power, 
quickly backed away. 
Instead of a tripartite council it proposed instead a multipartite forum 
of 30 to 50 members which would hâve had représentation from farmers, 
fishermen, consumers, professions and other groups in addition to labour 
and business22. Instead of negotiating socioeconomic policy the forum 
would hâve had only an advisory rôle. In its green paper Agenda for Co-
opération the government explicitly stated that it would not "bind itself to 
adopt any consensus décision'', because to do so "would pose a challenge 
19 Thomas K. S H O G A M A , " A Fédéral Perspect ive" , in William Dodge, éd. , Consulta-
tion and Consensus: A New Era in Policy Formulation, Ot tawa, Conférence Board in Canada , 
1978. For more detailed discussions of the controls era see M A S L Ô V E , Allan and Gène 
S W I M M E R , Wage Controls in Canada, 1975-78, Montréal Institute for Research on Public 
Policy, 1980 and Anthony G I L E S , " T h e Canadian Labour Congress and Tr ipa r t i sm" , Rela-
tions industrielles, vol. 37, no 1, 1982, pp . 93-125. 
20 Attack on Inflation, Ot tawa, Government of Canada , 1975. 
21 Ron L A N G , " L a b o u r ' s Manifesto for Canada : A New Independence?" , Proceedings 
of the Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association, Atlantic City, New 
Jersey, September, 1976. 
22 Agenda for Co-operation, Ot tawa, Government of Canada , 1977. 
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to the supremacy of Parliament and raise fundamental constitutional prob-
lems"23. 
Thèse positions are major stumbling blocks on the road to consensus. 
Few would argue against the proposition that the government must main-
tain its sovereign right to décide in the last resort. On the other hand it is 
factually incorrect to hold the position today, as Jean Lesage once did, that 
"the Crown does not negotiate". This is the same argument which was used 
by governments for décades to deny bargaining rights to civil servants. But 
today the governments does negotiate, not only with civil servants but also 
with foreign governments, provincial governments, and many other parties 
with which it has dealings. Collective negotiations are an intégral part of 
our complex, organized society of the late twentieth century. To insist that 
government will not or may not negotiate is to maintain a posture charac-
teristic of an authoritarian âge which is quickly fading into history. 
In principal, the multipartite proposition appears to be reasonable and 
équitable. It would allow ail groups concerned with socioeconomic policy to 
participate formally in the quest for consensus. In spite of its apparent at-
tractiveness, however, it has several drawbacks. First, while business and 
labour must be concerned with the full panoply of socioeconomic policy, 
the other groups are interested in as smaller range of issues. It is very doubt-
ful that their représentatives would be willing or able to address the prob-
lems at hand from the holistic perspective of the overall public interest. As a 
resuit it is very unlikely that multipartism could achieve consensus. The 
most probable outcome would be the continuation of the présent system 
rather than a meaningful change in the system. In countries with effectively 
functioning tripartism government is expected to consult with and take into 
account the narrower interests of sectoral groups in its discussions with 
labour and business. Second, from the perspective of labour, multipartism 
is viewed as a technique designed to maintain a low level of labour influ-
ence. Because of considérable dissension within the ranks of labour regard-
ing the desirability and potential efficacy of tripartism, the multipartite pro-
posai makes it essentially impossible for labour leaders to achieve a man-
date to pursue consensus. In short, although multipartism is theoretically 
appealing it effectively ensures the continuation of dissensus. 
Because of its stand on thèse issues the government, according to a top 
level business spokesman, "squandered a real opportunity in 1977 to enlist 
the sincère co-operation of both business and labour in terms of voluntary 
restraint in the post-controls period" and reinforced the suspicion that it 
had no real désire to engage in a meaningful search for consensus24. 
23 Ibid., p . 33, 30. 
24 Alfred P O W I S , " A Viewpoint from Business" , in Dodge, Ed . , Consultation and 
Consensus, op. cit., p . 30. 
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Since the mid-70's the fédéral government has continued along the path 
of consulting with various interest groups and then devising policies which 
as often as not ignore rather than incorporate the views expressed. In many 
cases the fédéral bureaucracy obviously has more influence over elected of-
ficiais than do the views of business and labour. A récent example is indi-
cative. 
In order to address the training crisis mentioned earlier the CLC and 
the BCNI came to agreement regarding the appropriate policy initiative. 
They jointly recommended the establishment of an Industrial Labour 
Market Institute "composed largely of volunteers from the labour and busi-
ness communities supported by a small professional stall"25. The job of the 
Institute would be to develop inventories of labour market requirements 
and make recommendations regarding training, adjustment assistance, 
mobility, immigration and unemployment insurance. 
This proposai was a much more moderate one than a similar 
"demand" made by the CLC during the controls era. In 1976 Congress pro-
posed a Labour Market Board to be "established by législation with the 
necessary funding and delegated authority to oversee and administer the 
labour force on a national basis"26. The Board would "hâve authority for" 
forecasting, training, mobility grants, regulating immigration and unem-
ployment insurance. In essence this agency would hâve assumed responsi-
bility for most of the functions now carried out by the Canadian Employ-
ment and Immigration Commission. For Canada that would hâve been a 
major departure from past practice. The proposai was not, however, a radi-
cal social innovation. Similar boards hâve operated successfully for décades 
in several European countries including West Germany and Sweden27. The 
Commission bureaucracy was appalled by the proposai and it went no-
where. Whereas the 1976 Board would hâve been an authoritative body with 
power to administer policy the 1981 Institute would hâve been only an advi-
sory organization28. In industrial relations terms the CLC lowered its de-
mand in the five year intérim and in doing so won suport from the business 
community. But the fédéral government was still unwilling to make conces-
sions. 
25 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Spécial Commit tee on Employment O p -
p o r t u n i t é s for the 80s, February 6, 1981, Ot tawa, House of C o m m o n s , 1981. 
26 "Pos i t ion Paper on the Practical Applicat ion of L a b o u r ' s Manifesto for C a n a d a " , 
Canadian Labour Comment, November 26, 1976. 
27 See J . S T I N G L , " R ô l e and Structure of the German Fédéral Employment Institu-
t ion" , International Labour Review, Sept.-Oct., 1977, pp. 197-208 and Lennart 
FORSEBACK, Industrial Relations and Employment in Sweden, Stockholm, The Swedish In-
stitute, 1976. 
28 Minutes of Evidence, op. cit. 
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The institute proposai apparently received very little serious attention. 
At the time it was made an internai task force of the Canadian Employment 
and Immigration Commission (CEIC), composed entirely of bureaucrats, 
was in the process of developing fédéral government labour market strategy 
for the 1980's. Its report entitled Labour Market Development in the 1980s 
seems to hâve become the blueprint for fédéral policy29. Not only did the 
task force fail to address the joint CLC/BCNI proposai, it also misread the 
évidence provided by the CLC and the BCN1 to the Parliamentary Commit-
tee on Employment Opportunities for the 1980s. Jointly the CLC and the 
BCNI proposed the Industrial Labour Market Institute but separately the 
CLC proposed a levy-grant funding System. It its report the CEIC task 
force rejected the grant-levy proposai which it attributed jointly to the CLC 
and BCNI30. However, in the présentation to the Parliamentary Committee 
the Chairman of the BCNI Task Force on Employment and Immigration 
stated, "We would like to keep the grant-levy program aspect of this thing 
separate from thèse discussions, because it is not a program which has been 
addressed for study by the BCNI committee concerned with this, so we 
would not want to be associated with that particular aspect."31 Not only do 
we not hâve tripartism we hâve not even been able to develop social mecha-
nisms which provide for effective communication among the national ac-
tors in the System. 
Subséquent to the report of the Dodge Commission CEIC did take the 
Labour Market Institute proposai under considération and rejected it on the 
basis that it was not multipartite in composition32. 
In addition to the unwillingness of fédéral government to negotiate 
there are many other impediments to the establishment of tripartism in 
Canada. In other countries with successfully functioning tripartite Systems 
both labour and business hâve organizations which are considered to speak 
authoritatively for the two viewpoints but in Canada the voices of both 
business and labour are more diffuse. On the labour side there are, in addi-
tion to the CLC, other labour organizations of importance such as the new 
Canadian Fédération of Labour, the Quebec-based Confédération of Na-
tional Trade Unions and independent bodies representing teachers and 
nurses, for example. The business perspective is represented notably by the 
BCNI but also by the Chamber of Commerce, the Canadian Manufacturers 
29 Labour Market Development in the 1980s, O t tawa , Employment and Immigrat ion 
Canada , July, 1981. 
30 Ibid., p . 221 . 
31 Minuts of Proceedings..., op. cit. 
32 Comments of the Minister of Employment and Immigrat ion to the Canad ian Indus-
trial Relations Associat ion, June 4, 1982. 
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Association, the Canadian Fédération of Independent Business and other 
important industry and provincial associations. Critics of tripartite propo-
sais argue that this multiplicity combined with weak internai controls render 
labour market organizations incompétent to commit their constituents. The 
fédéral form of government is also an impediment. In order to move to ef-
fective action on many issues there is a need for federal-provincial agree-
ment as well as tripartite consensus. There is also an absence of unanimity 
in regard to the desirability of moving towards a new decision-making Sys-
tem. Many within the ranks of business and labour do not accept the logic 
of tripartism33. Those on the labour left see it as class collusion and those on 
the right are unwilling to see any décline in the autonomy of national and in-
ternational unions. Many labour leaders fear that effective tripartism would 
reduce the attractiveness of the New Démocratie Party whose program the 
CLC endorses. Similar objections exist within the business community. 
Some business executives are afraid that the formation of a comprehensive 
and authoritative business fédération would affirm a classist, in contrast to 
a pluralist, interprétation of society. Others are unwilling to recognize the 
legitimacy of union claims to speak for the working population as a whole34. 
Most top corporate officers are loath to transfer significant power to busi-
ness associations. 
Finally there is the problem of the bureaucracy. Fédéral bureaucrats 
hâve a privileged position in regard to the elected government and, quite 
naturally, they do not want to see their position compromised by a rise in 
business and labour influence35. 
Although thèse Canadian realities make the achievement of consensus 
more difficult than in other countries one should not conclude that résigna-
tion to the status quo is the only option. There is much that the fédéral gov-
ernment could do to ease the constraints. The évidence reviewed hère sug-
gests that the organizations which are perhaps most représentative of labour 
and business — the CLC and the BCNI — are prepared to negotiate on 
some range of issues. To date, however, they hâve a poor record of concrète 
achievement. Despite public statements to the contrary, the government has 
displayed a persistent unwillingness to reach accommodation. Should the 
government revise its policy and reach accord with the CLC and the BCNI 
on issues over which it has effective control then strong pressures towards 
33 M A L L E S , op. cit. 
34 During the controls era some business executives insisted that if any nat ional forum 
was established the " u n o r g a n i z e d " should be represented on it. See Shirley C A R R , "Replace 
Controls with National F o r u m " , T o r o n t o , Globe and Mail, March 5, 1977. 
35 See Wilfred LIST, "Bureaucracy Blocking Labour-Business Forum Morris Says", 
Toronto, Globe and Mail, February 22, 1977 and Deborah M c G R E G O R , " D e b a t e , Consensus 
Bypassed by a Coterie of M a n d a r i n s " , Financial Times, J anuary 18, 1982. 
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effective tripartism would be set in motion. One of the main bases of rank 
and file opposition to tripartism is the belief, supported by expérience to 
date, that the government is more interested in selling preconceived policies 
than in reaching accord. Examples of successful achievement by the CLC 
and the BCNI would do much to overcome this basis of opposition. Suc-
cessful achievement on some issues could also be expected to set in motion 
pressures for more unity and stronger organizational compétence to nego-
tiate additional aspects of socioeconomic policy. Fragmentation of the 
labour and business communities existed at the outset in several of the coun-
tries which now hâve effectively functioning tripartite Systems. In ail of 
them the long term trend has been towards more business and labour unity. 
Thèse actors found that when they speak with one voice they aire more ef-
fective than when they speak with many voices. However, in a situation 
where "the Crown does not negotiate" the forces for disunity are more like-
ly to exceed contrary pressures. 
Despite the anti-interventionist statements of récent years the public 
has corne to hold government accountable for unemployment, inflation, 
and the overall standard of living. To influence thèse aspects of économie 
life government must intervene and thus it must crucially affect relations 
between management and labour. Collective bargaining has long since 
ceased to be an autonomous institution. A 10% wage increase is an effective 
decrease when priées are rising by 12% because of government policy. The 
value of fringe benefits change radically according to the way they are 
treated by the tax authorities. Government has become a "ghost at the bar-
gaining table" not only in the public sector but also in the private sector. 
For thèse reasons business and labour hâve had to put more resources into 
j>olitical activity. From the government perspective it has become extremely 
difficult to manage the economy and thus achieve the objectives expected by 
the public without the co-operation of labour and business. As the expéri-
ence of the récent fédéral budget suggests vociferous opposition to govern-
ment policy makes it ail but impossible to go about the business of éco-
nomie management in a matter of fact manner. It is such observations 
which hâve led many of the countries of the industrialized world to con-
clude that the structure and process of decision-making is crucial to socio-
economic success. The performance of the countries which hâve developed 
the most effective tripartite mechanisms support that belief. Unless Canada 
is able to develop similar mechanisms we may be in for a period of extended 
hard times. Because of the impediments to tripartism it is by no means cer-
tain that a change of heart by the fédéral government would necessarily pro-
duce a smoothly operating tripartite System. On the other hand, consensus 
has essentially no chance of success unless the fédéral government takes the 
first step by offering to negotiate in good faith with labour and business. 
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Le gouvernement fédéral et le tripartisme 
Depuis la deuxième guerre mondiale, la plupart des pays occidentaux ont établi 
un système de prise de décision tripartite qui regroupe les syndicats, les associations 
d'employeurs et l'État en vue de rechercher un consensus en matière de politique 
économique et sociale. Ce système est fondé sur la conviction que la structure et le 
processus de prise de décision est un facteur décisif dans la poursuite des objectifs 
socio-économiques. Sans l'appui du monde du travail et du milieu des affaires, l'ac-
tion unilatérale de l'État, se fondant sur la seule théorie économique, ne peut guère 
être fructueuse. Les pays d'Europe qui ont instauré des systèmes tripartites (notam-
ment le Danemark, la Norvège, la Suède, la Hollande et la Belgique) ont mieux réussi 
durant la dernière décennie que les États-Unis et le Canada où le tripartisme est sous-
développé. 
Apparemment, le gouvernement fédéral canadien se rend compte de la désirabi-
lité de s'orienter vers une politique de consensus comme le laissent entendre les décla-
rations des ministres et du premier ministre lui-même. Le gouvernement fédéral n'a 
pas voulu cependant prendre les mesures nécessaires pour instituer un système tripar-
tite efficace. Dans de tels systèmes qui fonctionnent bien, l'État négocie fondamen-
talement la politique socio-économique avec les principaux représentants du monde 
du travail et du milieu des affaires et il s'engage à mener à bonne fin les décisions 
consensuelles qui résultent du processus de négociation. Le gouvernement canadien, 
toutefois, refuse de négocier avec les syndicats et les associations d'employeurs et 
veut absolument que tout processus de recherche d'un consensus soit multipartite et 
de nature consultative. De plus, il refuse de s'engager à mettre en vigueur quelque 
décision consensuelle. En règle générale, il consulte les différents groupes d'intéres-
sés mais, par la suite, il applique des politiques qui, le plus souvent qu'autrement, 
ignorent au lieu d'incorporer les points de vue qui ont été exprimés. À cause de la 
répugnance du gouvernement à faire des concessions valables et à poursuivre une ac-
tion efficace, on retrouve dans le monde du travail et le milieu des affaires la convic-
tion que l'État ne désire pas sincèrement réaliser de consensus, mais plutôt les con-
sulter en vue d'obtenir leur acquiescement à ses projets déjà arrêtés. 
En outre de la volonté du gouvernement de s'en tenir à un multipartisme consul-
tatif et à son insistance, effectivement fausse, à affirmer que «la Couronne ne négo-
cie pas», il y a plusieurs autres aspects du contexte canadien qui militent contre un 
tripartisme efficace. 
Le monde du travail et le milieu des affaires sont divisés et on trouve beaucoup 
de réticence à l'intérieur de ces groupes à donner aux organisations centrales le man-
dat de négocier la politique socio-économique. Nombre de sujets importants exigent 
par ailleurs la coopération fédérale-provinciale pour qu'on puisse passer aux actes. 
Pour ces motifs, il n'est nullement certain qu'un tripartisme efficace en résulte-
rait, même si le gouvernement acceptait de négocier de bonne foi avec les représen-
tants des organismes centraux des salariés et des employeurs. À moins que l'on ne 
s'entende pour le faire, cependant, il n'y a véritablement aucune chance qu'un tel 
système puisse être institué. Si l'affirmation selon laquelle le consensus du monde du 
travail, du milieu des affaires et de l'État est juste, tel qu'incite à le penser l'expé-
rience de plusieurs pays occidentaux, le Canada est peut-être mûr pour des jours dif-
ficiles. 
